John J. Mearsheimer
Offensive realism posits that the international system is defined by an anarchic structure with no central authority to protect nations from one another. States inherently possess offensive military capabilities and can never be entirely certain about the intentions of their peers. Within this environment, the primary goal of any great power is survival, which dictates that states must act rationally to preserve their territorial integrity and domestic political order. These structural factors compel states to operate with a zero sum mentality regarding global power dynamics.
Because states can never accurately predict when a peaceful neighbor might turn hostile, they cannot settle for merely maintaining the current balance of power. Defensive strategies are insufficient for ensuring long term survival. Instead, nations are driven to maximize their relative power at the expense of others, pushing relentlessly toward the ultimate goal of becoming a hegemon. This constant pursuit of dominance generates a perpetual security dilemma, where one state's efforts to increase its own security automatically threaten the security of its rivals, making conflict virtually inevitable.
Achieving global hegemony is practically impossible due to the profound geographic limitations imposed by oceans. Large bodies of water severely restrict the power projection capabilities of land armies, making it exceedingly difficult for a state to launch a successful amphibious invasion against another well armed great power. Consequently, the best outcome a nation can realistically achieve is regional hegemony, dominating its immediate neighborhood while remaining relatively safe from distant competitors.
Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it seeks to prevent the rise of peer competitors in other regions. It adopts a strategy of offshore balancing, relying on local states to contain any rising power in their own territory. The regional hegemon prefers to pass the buck, avoiding the massive costs of direct military intervention unless local forces are on the verge of failure. This approach ensures that distant great powers remain bogged down in their own security competitions, leaving the offshore balancer free to roam and project influence globally without worrying about threats in its own backyard.
Great powers employ various calculated strategies to increase their power or diminish that of their rivals. Direct methods include war, which is pursued when the potential gains outweigh the costs, and blackmail, which relies on the threat of force to extract concessions. States also utilize indirect strategies to weaken adversaries without expending their own resources. The bait and bleed strategy involves provoking rival nations into a protracted war to drain their military strength, while bloodletting simply allows an existing conflict between rivals to drag on as long as possible.
The United States stands as the only great power to have successfully achieved regional hegemony, dominating the Western Hemisphere while remaining protected by two vast oceans. This exceptional geographic and strategic security makes the United States an ambivalent balancer. Intervening in distant regions to stop a potential hegemon is politically contentious and extraordinarily costly. Because the threat of direct invasion across an ocean is minimal, American leaders often hesitate to commit military forces abroad until a provocation makes the need for intervention undeniable.
As China rapidly accumulates wealth, offensive realism dictates that it will inevitably convert its economic might into military power to seek regional hegemony in Asia. A wealthy and powerful China will not remain a status quo power but will attempt to dominate its neighbors, adopting a posture similar to the American approach in the Western Hemisphere. In response, the United States and vulnerable regional actors will form balancing coalitions to contain Chinese expansion, creating intense security competition and arms races in the region.
China's actions in the South China Sea perfectly illustrate the offensive realist pursuit of territorial control and power maximization. By constructing artificial islands on submerged reefs and equipping them with military installations, China projects its offensive capabilities outward. Claiming vast maritime territories through its nine dash line allows China to assert sovereignty over strategic resources and trade routes. These actions are calculated, rational steps designed to solidify regional dominance and ensure survival in an anarchic environment.
To enforce its maritime claims, China employs operational coercion, using its coast guard and naval forces to intimidate foreign vessels and disrupt the economic activities of neighboring states. When international tribunals rule against these territorial assertions, China categorically rejects the verdicts. This legal rejectionism underscores the realist principle that no supranational authority can compel a great power to act against its own strategic interests. In a self help system, maintaining relative power and territorial integrity completely overrides compliance with international law.
While offensive realism provides a potent explanation for power competition, its strict focus on structural imperatives ignores critical internal factors that shape state behavior. The theory dismisses the impact of domestic politics, ideology, and the specific nature of a government, treating diverse nations as identical actors driven only by the pursuit of power. This framework struggles to account for the stabilizing effects of economic interdependence, the role of international institutions in fostering cooperation, and the possibility that states might prioritize absolute economic gains over relative military dominance.